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In The Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
ERNEST W. COWLEY, aka, E. W. 
COWLEY, and C. FRANK COWLEY, 
aka, C. F. COWLEY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
-vs.-
J. L. WATTERSON, 
Defendant and Respondent 
APPELLANTS' 
REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 1806 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent's counsel contend that plaintiffs' action 
is one for damages, hence is a law case and not an action 
in equity. Reference is made to any inquiry by the court 
at the beginning of the trial, relative to the nature of the 
action; whether it was a "water case with incidental dam-
ages or a damage suit." One of plaintiffs' counsel replied 
that it was a damage case and further stated that there 
was no question about water rights, which was directly 
responsive to the court's inquiry. If the court had ex-
amined plaintiffs' complaint prior to the trial, he would 
have been definitely informed that plaintiffs action was 
one in equity to enjoin defendant from placing a dam in 
said pipe, thus preventing the water from flowing freely 
through the same, and that "upon the final hearing of this 
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2 
cause, that the said injunction be made permanent." It 
is respectfully submitted that regardless of the aforesaid 
remarks of court or counsel as aforesaid, it does not affect 
or change the nature or character of the action, from one 
in equity to an action at law. The claim for damages is 
more or less incidental, the principal relief sought in said 
action is for a permanent injunction to prevent the de-
fendant "from further placing a dam in said pipe and pre-
venting said water from passing through the same." 
It will be observed from the map that the elevation 
of the bottom of the barrow pit at point No. 2, at the 
south-eastern portion of plaintiffs' property, where the 
water enters the said barrow pit from the slough is 92.22, 
and the bottom of the pipe at point No. 9, is 91.14, or a 
decline of only 1.08, or slightly over one foot decline over 
a distance of about three-fourths of a mile. It will thus 
be seen that when the end of the pipe is completely 
covered as it was in June and July, 1953, that it would 
naturally raise the surface of the water and back it up 
southeasterly along the barrowpit, and also easterl:· along 
the ditch on the north side of plaintiffs property. 
It is stated on page 18 of respondent's brief. "There 
is no question of the Railroad building this ditch in the 
barrow pit for its own use. It was constructed so that it 
would carry off the water that had formerl~· crossed over 
where the railroad was built and used b:' the irrigators 
to irrigate their lands in lieu of the old ditch." The fore-
going statement is not supported b:' the eYidence. The 
undisputed evidence reveals that prior to the constntction 
of the railroad right of way, the slough or ditch which 
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was filled in by the construction of the right of way, at 
point No. 2, as shown on map, had previously carried 
water westerly and northwesterly to or near point 14, also 
shown on the map, to irrigate the land on the north side 
thereof including all of plaintiff's property on the north 
side of the right of way a~d said ditch entered the plaint- "" 
tiff's property in the vicinity of Point No. 6 as shown on 
said map. .. -
Therefore, it was deemed more convenient for the 
railroad company, as well as the plaintiffs to conduct the 
water in said slough as it reached the barrow pit at point 
No. 2, as shown on the map, and thence into and along 
the north barrow pit to the vicinity of point No. 6, where 
it was taken by means of a ditch leading from the barrow 
pit on to the plaintiff's land. For a more detailed dis-
cussion of this point, reference is made to pages 2 - 4 of 
appellant's brief. 
PlaintiH testified that the ditch along the East side 
of the Stewart property, North of the right of way, was 
made after the construction of the railroad right of way. 
The evidence shows that on one or more occasions 
when Hebaus was growing grain on the land East of the 
house he asked for the use of water and he was permitted 
to use water to irrigate one or more dry spots. But the 
undisputed evidence shows that he paid for such use and 
when he sold his property to defendant, he did not con-
vey any water right to the land East of the house. 
The decree entered in the Utah Power & Light case 
definitely shows that Hebaus claimed only one water right. 
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Defendant contends that his predecessor who owned 
his property prior to the construction of the railroad right 
of way, took water from the slough through a ditch lead-
ing therefrom and Northerly along the East side of the 
Stewart property to the ditch now used by defendant 
North of the right of way; that when the right of way was 
constructed in 1912, this ditch South of the right of way 
to the slough was abandoned or fell into disuse. If such 
ditch actually existed and was so used, and counsel states 
that pipes were rusted under the tracks at certain intervals, 
why did not the owner of the property at that time con-
tinue to use the ditch for such irrigation purpose after the 
construction of the railroad. It would have been a simple 
matter to have conducted the water North from the slough 
through a pipe under the right of way and connecting the 
ditch on the South and North sides of the right of way. 
If this had been done then subsequent owners of the de-
fendant's property could have continued to use the ditch, 
and such use would not have interferred in any way with 
the plaintiff's lands situated some forty rods Eastery from 
such ditch. Defendant's predecessor could and would 
have no doubt adopted the above mentioned plan if in 
fact such a ditch did actually exist and was in such use 
prior to the construction of the railroad. 
The evidence is undisputed that defendant's prede-
cessor Hebaus, who owned the property ''"hen the raihoad 
was constructed or shortly thereafter, was irrigating about 
one hundred seventy-five acres of land 'Vest of the home 
situated on defendant's propert~'· 
About six years after the railroad was constructed the 
Utah Power & Light Company brought an action against 
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aU of the water users in Cache County, requiring them to 
appear in said action and claim their water right. In fact, 
\ l r. Hebaus, along with other water users from the Swift 
slough, were made parties in said action and they claimed 
a water right through a ditch leading from the slough 
about one hunderd rods West of the East end of the 
Stewart property. Hebaus claimed a water right from said 
slough to irrigate one hundred seventy-five acres 'Vest of 
the house, along with other adjoining land owners using 
the ditch, or ditches, West of his ditch. This water right 
was adjudicated for the Hebaus land West of the home 
and has been used there continuously since and defendant 
admits that he uses water from the Swift slough to irrigate 
the land West of the home. 
Plaintiffs testified that the land situated East of the 
home had no water right and had always been devoted to 
production of dry farm grain. And their testimony is 
definitely supported by the fact that Hebaus did not 
claim a water right for the property East of the home in 
the Utah Power & Light case. 
ARGUMENT 
It is respectfully submitted that the cases cited in 
respondent's brief do not involve the facts and circum-
stances present in the case at bar. In Dahnken vs. George 
Romney & Sons Co., 111 Utah 471, 184 Pac 2nd, 211, it 
seems to be conceded that the defendants had an ease-
ment to cross area "C" by their adverse use thereof, but 
the issue was whether the easement had been abandoned. 
Stanley vs. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d. 465, was 
an action to quiet title. However, the subject matter and 
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facts in that case are entirely different from the facts and 
subject matter in the case at bar, so that the trial court's 
decision setting aside the deed to the defendant, is not 
comparable to the trial courts decision in the instant case. 
In Wilcox vs. Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 Pac. 2d. 1, 
involved the priority of a certain Mechanics lien claimed 
by the contractor, and a Mortgage indebtedness in favor 
of the Deseret Building Society. 
In Millard vs. Parry, 2 Utah 2d. 217, 271 P. 2d. 852, 
the plaintiff a building contractor, sued Parry the owner 
of a new home. The evidence disclosed that the defend-
ant had overpaid the plaintiff in the sum of $435.30, for 
which amount the court awarded judgment in favor of 
the defendant; and the defendant also counter claimed 
against plaintiff, contending that the trial court had er-
roneously denied plaintiff interest on sums aggregating 
$3,781.50, found to be due Parry at time of trial; and by 
allowing Parry credit for interest paid to the subcontrac-
tors in connection with their lien claims. It will thus be 
seen that the facts as well as the subject matter are not 
relevant to the facts and issues involved in the case at bar. 
The facts in the case of Holm vs. Davis, 41 Utah 200; 
125 Pac. 403, are not applicable to the facts in the instant 
case. The plaintiff in that case did not contend that the 
defendant did not have an easement for the canal to cross 
his property, but his sole complaint was that the owner of 
the canal had no right to n1aintain the canal by cleaning it 
and depositing the waste material on the bank adjoining 
his property. 
The case of Board of Directors vs. City of Ceres, 254 
P. 2nd. 907, is in no wise similar to the case at bar. That 
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a:ction was brought by the Board of Directors of Turlock 
Inigation District against the City of Ceres et, al. to main-
tain that po:rtion of defendant's pipeline, which lay in and 
was cJossed by pub1ic streets in the City of Ceres. The 
Superior Court refused to grant the claim, but on appeal 
to the District Court of Appeal, the judgment of the trial 
court was reversed. It is respectfully submitted that the 
facts in that case are entirely foreign to the facts in the 
case at bar. 
In Griffiths vs. Archibald, 272 P. 2nd. 586, the undis-
puted facts disclosed that plaintiff claimed a prescriptive 
easement in an irrigation ditch across the adjoining resi-
dence property of her sister, the defendant. The admitted 
facts disclosed that for more than 20 years prior to the 
commence1~1c~nt of the action, the plaintiff and husband 
had used and maintained an irrigation ditch across de-
fendant's property, but it was also found to be a fact that 
such use was permissive, and that it did not become hostile 
until the summer of 1952, when defendant's husband filled 
the ditch where it ran across defendant's lot. The jury 
found from the evidence that the use of the ditch did not 
become hostile until such ditch was filled by defendant's 
husband, and plaintiff's husband reopened it or attempted 
to reopen the ditch when he was finally prevented from 
the ft1ther use of the ditch. . 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erron-
eously entered judgment in defendant's favor; that the 
same be reversed by this Honorable Court, remanding the 
case and directing the trial court to enter findings, conclus-
ions and judgment permanently enjoining the defendant 
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from placing a dam in said pipe, or doing or committing 
any other act that will interfere with the plaintiffs' use of 
their irrigation water or damaging their land and crops, 
and for such other and further relief as this court may 
deem that plaintiffs and appellants are entitled to in the 
premises, including costs on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. E. NELSON, 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASSMAN, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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